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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated the validity of the Royal Australian Navy’s proposed 
Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) model and the Navy Management Diary (NMD) 
with its accompanying fatigue measurement tool. A simulated 21-member Armidale 
Class Patrol Boat (ACPB) crew was constructed in the NMD to assess the NSWW. The 
NMD fatigue measurement tool and the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue and Task Effectiveness 
(SAFTE) model, and its software instantiation, the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool 
(FAST), were used to estimate risk for the periods of activity across the three weeks, 
resulting in comparison of the associated risk levels identified by the NMD fatigue tool 
and corresponding FAST scores.  
In the proposed RAN NSWW model, the category of maintenance most often 
exceeded its allocated hours, leading to the recommendation that further research on a 
larger sample might address whether the proposed NSWW should be customized to be 
platform and occupation specific. The NMD and FAST software tool comparisons 
resulted in statistically significant differences in predicted risk. The discussion speculates 
on why these discrepancies exist between the two software tools.  The thesis recommends 
that this methodology be replicated using a larger sample and include empirical 
observations of performance in actual operations before comparing to FAST-generated 
predicted effectiveness levels.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis aims to investigate the impact of the possible introduction of the U.S. 
Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), specifically 
on the small ship crew level. The thesis utilizes a simulation of a typical crew and 
associated activities and the impact of fatigue and degradation of performance while at 
sea. This investigation is framed using the RAN’s cultural reform program, New 
Generation Navy (NGN); specifically, its people-focused policies.  
In 2008, the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) launched a significant 
reform program; the VADM Crane stated, “New Generation Navy is what I stand for. 
Navy must remain capable of defending this nation if called upon to do so. But we have 
to begin working smarter, not harder” (Kemp, 2008, p. 2). With these words, the RAN 
Chief announced his vision for the NGN program. Launching three areas of reform—
leadership and values, cultural reform, and structural reform—the plan was established 
on the dawn of receiving the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) and the 
Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) platforms. At the time of the launch, the 
Chief of Navy acknowledged that the program would be cultural as well as practical, 
“Changing old habits won’t always be easy but New Generation Navy is here to stay” 
(Kemp, 2008, p. 2). 
Positioned under the three reforms were the three pillars of the NGN: People, 
Performance, and Professionalism. The three pillars were the cornerstones of ten 
signature behaviors that were designed to give clear guidance on the behavior and 
performance of personnel within the Royal Australian Navy. The first pillar, People, 
related to individual behaviors, but also to how individuals interacted with others. The 
pillar’s underlying value was to respect every member’s contribution, and encouraged 
individuals to consider how they help others make a full contribution to the RAN through 
the three behaviors. The second pillar, Performance, was aimed at empowering 
individuals to take action to improve their workplace. The four behaviors outline specific 
actions such as being cost conscious, fixing problems, taking action, and challenging and 
innovating. The third pillar, Professionalism, directly related to the RAN’s vision 
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statement: “An Australian Navy renowned for excellence in service to the nation” and the 
RANs motto: “Navy–Serving Australia with Pride.” The three signature behaviors under 
this pillar describe how individuals could best serve their country and abide by the 
RAN’s vision and motto. Behaviors for this pillar include “Be the best I can be,” and 
“make Navy proud, make Australia proud.” 
The original NGN reforms set out key focus points. The cultural reform included 
“reducing the increasing expectation that operational reliefs are an acceptable method of 
crewing ships at no notice.” Within the structural reform, there was to be a shift away 
from relying on training at sea: in order to unblock training pipelines, more training was 
to be conducted alongside while in port. Finally, the leadership and values reform 
focused on “expression of how the values of individuals contribute to effective group 
mission accomplishment” (Barrett, 2014).  
As naval platforms incorporate improved technology and implement unmanned 
systems, there is the expectation that platforms will function with reduced crewing. As a 
result, there has been an increased prevalence of sleep deprivation and fatigue among 
crew members, and the resulting degradation of performance at the individual and unit 
level. There has been renewed scientific interest surrounding the themes of sleep, fatigue, 
performance, and endurance, and how the themes interact or influence one another in 
military environments. While authors’ definitions of each of these themes vary, the 
recognized side effects among them are similar. Reduced mental capacity, poor decision 
making, emotional outbursts or withdrawals, and reduced alertness are among the side 
effects that have been associated with the themes. Perhaps more alarmingly is the 
association of  fatigue and related issues with major maritime accidents.  
Recent work by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
(DSTO) has focused on work hours as an indication of rest/sleep patterns for individuals 
and the individuals’ subsequent performance. A four-month study was conducted as part 
of the New Generation Navy program, specifically examining People-Focused Work 
Practices. The study was designed to “objectively measure individual crew work, 
recovery and sleep hours” (Grech, Roberts, Hamilton, Turner, Cleary, & Warren, 2013) 
under realistic shipboard working conditions. Grech et al. note that “the final crew 
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configuration ultimately influences the number of hours worked and hence sleep/recovery 
time obtained by crew during shipboard operations, subsequently affecting overall crew 
endurance and safety” (Grech et al., 2013). 
In addition, the DSTO has recently conducted two studies of the RAN relevant to 
crew endurance and the sleep-work hours performed by crews, namely of HMAS 
Warramunga, a frigate, and Australian submarines (2014, in preparation). Currently, the 
RAN is conducting scenario analysis on workload studies for various platforms. Scenario 
analysis for HMAS Choules, a Bay-class landing ship, was completed using the RAN’s 
proposed NSWW model. Historically, the RAN utilized an information communications 
technology (ICT) platform called MONICAR to streamline reporting of personnel, 
competency of skills, training and defect reports. Recently, the platform has been 
upgraded and integrated into a new system, the Naval Management Diary (NMD). The 
NMD system is designed to increase the previous functionality offered by MONICAR by 
increasing efficiencies in ship and crew management, and subsequently fatigue 
management. The NMD system was trialed during the sustainable workload studies in 
HMAS Warramunga, and further data was collected from Armidale class patrol boats 
(ACPB) between 2011 and 2013—although this data was not analyzed by DSTO. In 
addition to NMD data, the studies conducted during these trials also recorded sleep 
patterns and individual crew members’ activities and tasks.  
In naval environments where high operational tempo and combat missions exist, 
crew members often experience additional stressors such as heat, noise, vibration, and 
confined-space work areas. Substantial effort has been made by individuals and 
command teams to smoothly adapt to the resulting cognitive fatigue. The United States 
Naval Postgraduate School has collected several data sets relating to work and sleep 
hours using similar navy standard work week models. Studies have been conducted on 
crew members of the USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93), a destroyer, and USS Rentz (FFG-
46), a frigate, and the USS Port Royal (CG-73) and USS Lake Erie (CG-70), guided 




actual work and activity patterns of the crew members. Collectively, these studies provide 
specific insight into crew fatigue and performance and informed the methodology used in 
this study.  
The United States Coast Guard also recognized the need to address fatigue, 
performance, and endurance of its crews, which resulted in the crew endurance 
management practices guidelines (2003). These guidelines created a pathway for other 
branches of the military to address the respective roles of command and the individual 
crew members in combating fatigue within the military. Despite significant efforts in 
policy and implementation of workforce modeling, such as a standard work week, fatigue 
is still prevalent and performance degradation remains throughout the maritime 
environment. Reduced manning, as noted by Grech et al. (2014), has led to a shift in the 
workload and work-rest schedules experienced by members of the sea-going community. 
The recent implementation of a standard work week model provides a baseline for 
measurement of fatigue and performance of small ship crews.  
In 2002, the Australia Defence Force released “Fatigue Management During 
Operations: A Commander’s Guide.” The guide defined fatigue as “the product of intense 
and prolonged emotional strain, poor and inadequate diet, strenuous physical exertion, 
unfavorable environmental conditions and sleep loss” (Murphy, 2002). The document 
urges commanders to “adopt techniques to manage fatigued soldiers other than threat of 
punishment” (Murphy, 2002). Despite its land operations focus, the guide highlights the 
potential for personnel and operational costs that are underlined by fatigue, and further, 
that the requirement for a “thorough knowledge of both sleep and the effects of fatigue 
are essential aspects of fatigue management” (Murphy, 2002). 
The NGN program reached its fifth anniversary in 2014. This milestone provided 
the Chief of Navy an opportunity to revisit the focus of the program and the work that 
still lay ahead. Since the program’s implementation, the Chief of Navy has changed to 
Vice Admiral Griggs. In a statement marking the program’s anniversary, VADM Griggs 
reaffirmed his commitment to the NGN and its role in cultural reform by stating “NGN is 
founded on a clear statement of cultural intent. This statement is significant. It is linked to 
NGN and to the Navy Strategy which is the blueprint for delivering our new capability 
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and aligns NGN with the broader Defence cultural reform program under Pathway to 
Change” (Griggs, 2015). VADM Griggs acknowledged the ambiguous and unpredictable 
environment in which the RAN operates. Further, he conceded that standard rules, 
processes or SOPs would never be able to cover the gamut of operational contexts. 
VADM Griggs went on to say that the program has met some success, a notable 
reduction in training force had been realized and separation rates had been reduced by 
25%. VADM Griggs acknowledged this success during his reaffirmation of the program:  
“Our workforce is in better shape than it was five years ago” (Griggs, 2015).  
This thesis offers a closer look into the work week of a typical sailor on an 
Armidale class patrol boat (ACPB) using a multipronged approach that combines two 
software tools: the RAN NMD and the Fatigue Avoidance Software Tool (FAST). The 
major goal of the thesis was to validate the use of the RAN NMD in regulating fatigue 
management on small ships. A second goal of the thesis was to contribute to the 
knowledge regarding standard work week models in a sea-going, operational 
environment. The original intent of the thesis was to use the work, rest and performance 
data collected on the crew of an ACPB in 2013. However, those data were not of 
sufficient quantity or quality to allow them to be used for modeling purposes. (The 
limitations of the 2013 ACPB data are discussed in Chapter II.) Consequently, the thesis 
simulated typical operations and crew constraints for an ACPB and modeled them for a 
3-week underway period using the proposed RAN Navy Standard Work Week model. In 
addition to meeting operational requirements, the simulated crew had to contribute to 
vessel maintenance and emergent repairs. This study hinged on simulated crew structures 
and events based on realistic crew and activity models. During the simulated three-week 
underway period, the crew undertook a variety of tasks consistent with patrol operations, 
including boarding party operations. Finally, by utilizing the FAST software, this thesis 
aims to provide insight into the predicted effectiveness of sailors aboard the Armidale 
class patrol boats during typical operations, as well as validating the results of the NMD’s 
fatigue management tool.  
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The following chapter provides a review of the current literature regarding sleep, 
performance, fatigue, and endurance. The literature review also examines studies of the 
U.S. Navy Standard Work Week and Australian investigations into fatigue management. 
The third chapter outlines the methodology used within the study, the fourth chapter 
offers results of the simulation, and the final chapter offers limitations, conclusions and 
recommendations of the study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Signs of fatigue soon manifested themselves more and more strongly, and 
slowly the men dropped out one by one, from sheer exhaustion. No 
murmur of complaint, however, would be heard. 
— Fritz Kreisler, Four Weeks in the Trenches, 1915 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Maritime work environments provide unique “stressor complexes” that contribute 
to mental and physical fatigue through working conditions, motion, extreme 
temperatures, poor diet, extreme workload, excessive workday hours, and separations 
from friends and family (Comperatore, Rivera, & Kingsley, 2005). The maritime and 
aviation communities, both military and corporate, have become increasingly consumed 
by the effects of fatigue, notably degradation of performance and the increased potential 
for accidents. In their study on operational alertness in the aviation community, 
Rosekind, Neri, and Dinges highlighted that solutions to management of fatigue must be 
integrated and multi-faceted, stating that “these factors preclude a simple solution and 
managing fatigue will benefit from addressing education, hours of service, strategies, 
technology, design, and research” (Rosekind et al., 1997, p. 71). Shattuck (2015) explains 
that there are many factors leading to disrupted sleep. These factors can be arranged in 
four broad categories, organizational, psychological-Pharmacological, environmental, 








Figure 1.  Factors leading to Disrupted Sleep 
 
Adapted from Shattuck (2015) 
A plethora of scientific literature exists relating to the importance of sleep. The 
literature encompasses the condition of fatigue and its effect on capabilities such as 
performance and endurance. The literature review for this study considered sleep, fatigue, 
performance, and endurance, and their known relationships along with associated 
measurement tools such as actigraphy, validation, the SAFTE model and FAST software. 
The review concludes with insights into the emerging tools—Royal Australian Navy’s 
(RAN) Navy Management Diary (NMD), the Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW)—




Sleep is an essential requirement of life for all humans. Without adequate 
amounts of sleep human performance is degraded. Sleep is defined as “to take rest by a 
suspension of the voluntary exercise of the powers of the body and mind, and an apathy 
of the organs of sense” (Webster, 2015). The word itself dates back before the 12th 
century and has been found in variation in Middle English, slepe; Old English, slǣp; and 
from the Latin labi, to slip.  
In general, sleep is broken into two parts—REM and non-REM. Miller and 
Firehammer (2007) discuss the differences between the two types and how each has its 
own set of observable behaviors. Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep is a single category 
of sleep. In contrast, non-REM sleep is divided into four stages as the sleep of the 
individual deepens, as illustrated in Figure 2. Here, different activities occur in the 
various stages of sleep. These differences make it important for the individual to gain 
adequate amounts of both types and all stages of sleep for optimal performance. To 
achieve optimal performance, the “average adult requires approximately eight hours of 
sleep” (Miller & Firehammer, 2007; Heisinger, 2009; National Sleep Foundation, 2015).  
Figure 2.  Sleep cycles throughout sleep 
 
Source: Mastin, L. (2013) 
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An individual’s circadian rhythms act as the time keeper, scheduling bodily 
functions and periods of sleepiness and wakefulness. Circadian rhythms control 
numerous factors in the human body including body temperature, sleep-wake cycles, and 
endocrine functions. The rhythms are “physical, mental, and behavioral changes that 
follow a roughly 24-hour cycle” (National Institute of General Medical Sciences, 2015). 
Despite being produced by the body naturally, rhythms respond to levels of lightness, and 
darkness, and are heavily influenced by the individual’s environment. The role of the 
circadian rhythm is particularly important in watch keeping roles within the military. 
Watch keeping is a term that describes shift-work in various occupations including the 
military and first response teams. Haynes (2007) characterizes shift work into three 
categories: permanent, rapidly rotating, and slowly rotating (p. 8). When considering 
watch keeping and circadian rhythms, the rate and direction of shift rotation should also 
be considered (Haynes, 2007). 
Figure 3.  Circadian Rhythm pattern in 24 hours 
 
Source: Brown (2013)  
A common stressor to the circadian physiology of naval crews is the watch 
schedule that is present in maritime environments. Such a schedule is further complicated 
by rotating shifts and the subsequent shift changes. A rotating watch schedule “not only 
impacts daily sleep duration and quality; it also desynchronizes the adjustment of the 
human biological or circadian clock” (Comperatore et al., 2005, B109).  
 11
In addition to the long workdays arising from watch schedules and other crew 
responsibilities, individuals employed in the naval environment are often required to 
undertake on-the-job training (OJT), which may affect the time available for sleep. As 
Maquet (2000) observed, sleep is important if the new skill that is learned during training 
is to be retained: “sleeping during the night after a single training session is critical to 
skill acquisition” (p. 1235). He further purported that sleep can significantly affect 
specific types of learning. For example, an individual will have increased REM sleep 
following training in tasks such as Morse Code. As a result, future performance of 
recently learned tasks will be impaired if the individual is sleep deprived immediately 
following the training (Maquet, 2000).  
Stickgold, James, and Hobson (2000) further discuss the requirement for sleep 
following training. The authors specifically considered visual discrimination learning for 
their study. In support of Maquet’s argument, Stickgold et al. agreed that a lack of sleep 
following training can interfere with memory consolidation. Further, they suggest that 
“the occurrence of sleep, rather than a simple passage of time” is required for adequate 
consolidation of material (Stickgold et al., p. 1237, 2000). Of note, Stickgold et al.  also 
suggest that the first night’s sleep following instruction is critical for consolidation and 
“subsequent sleep cannot replace the first night requirement” (p. 1237, 2000).  
C. FATIGUE 
Fatigue is commonly associated with maritime operations and can be defined in 
various ways. Davenport (2007) described fatigue as the “decline in mental performance, 
judgement, and complex decision-making, and is associated with a variety of symptoms” 
(p. 4). Davenport’s (2007) paper also supported the conclusions of  Roberts (2012) and 
Maquet (2000) with regard to learning stating that “depriving the brain of REM sleep by 
shortening the nightly sleep period from eight to six hours may significantly affect 
learning and retention” (p. 4).The term does not solely refer to one being tired. Miller 
(2009) defined fatigue as an “abstract term that describes an internal state of a human 
operator” (p. 2). Mental and physical performance and various characteristics of 
performance are also associated with fatigue. For example, reduced mental capacity, 
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alertness, diminished decision making, emotional outbursts, or withdrawals are also 
associated with fatigue. Sirois (2009) included loss of emotional awareness, reduced 
communication abilities, and information processes to the possible outcomes of 
experiencing fatigue.  
The past two decades have seen an increase in military unit command 
acknowledging sleep deprivation and fatigue and their impacts on individual and unit 
effectiveness. As Shay (1998) observed, “Disciplined scientific study of the topic may be 
relatively new, but thoughtful and observant leaders have generally understood sleep 
deprivation and its effects on individual and unit performance in combat” (p. 93). 
However, as recently as 2007, some authors have argued that despite the military’s 
acceptance of fatigue as an operational factor, its existence has become so ingrained in 
military communities that it is unconsciously ignored. According to Davenport (2007), 
“Fatigue is so prevalent and such a part of our culture that we scarcely see or recognize it. 
It’s the big gray elephant we muscle out of the cockpit when we fly, step around when we 
enter the bridge and push aside when we peer into the periscope” (p.5). Kilshaw (2008) 
went further to suggest that when considering the treatment of fatigue as a symptom of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) a culture exists where a “stiff upper lip” must be 
maintained (p.222). Further still, Kilshaw suggests that the psychiatric discourse that goes 
along with treatment was at odds with the “hegemonic ideal of masculinity in UK 
military culture” (2008, p. 223).  
Fatigue has been found to affect many facets of performance in the maritime 
environment. Green (2012) and Davenport (2007) suggest an individual’s training, 
education, personality, or motivations are not the cause of the fatigue related decrements. 
The only cure for fatigue is sleep. Sleep allows the individual to recover from the fatigue 
that the mind and body is under; prolonged periods of fatigue may have increasingly 
detrimental effects. Policy makers and command teams must address Davenport’s (2007) 
observations that militaries have accepted and essentially ignored fatigue.  
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D. PERFORMANCE 
Military environments provide unique conditions in which individuals and 
command teams are required to perform at high levels for extended periods of time. 
Miller and Firehammer (2007) argue that the correct number of crew required for ships, 
submarines, or aircraft squadrons should be determined by what is required to sustain 
human performance. Grech, Warren, Hamilton et al. (2013) assert that crew size has been 
minimized by automation and economic reform. Crews can experience significant side 
effects from prolonged exposure to high operational tempo and combat environments and 
must adapt to manage cognitive fatigue (Miller & Firehammer, 2007). Babkoff, Kelly 
and Naitoh (2001) highlighted the degradation of performance when exposed to long-
term sleep deprivation resulting in “decrements in cognitive and psychomotor 
performance” (p. 1). Further, they highlighted the impact of “various stimuli and 
environmental variables” (Babkoff, Kelly & Naitoh, p. 2, 2001).  
Objectively measuring performance is a complex task. One common way of 
measuring vigilance performance is the Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) (Dinges & 
Powell, 1985). Generally conducted as part of sleep deprivation studies, the PVT is a 
standardized test typically ten minutes in length. Participants are required to press a 
button in response to seeing a stimulus (flash of light or color change). The test has 
multiple stimuli at random intervals within the testing period. The PVT is easy to 
administer in clinical conditions and, as noted by Loh, Lamond, Dorrian et al (2004), 
methodically reliable. However, in a military environment, operational tempo may not 
allow for ideal testing conditions. Loh, Lamond, Dorrian et al. set out to test if PVT could 
be administered in shorter periods than the standard ten minutes. Their motivation for the 
study was to test the validity under less-than-ideal conditions. The authors suggest that 
shorter testing periods could benefit time-constrained work environments including 
aircraft flight decks and air traffic control rooms. By extrapolation, a shorter test could 
also be appropriate in the maritime environment where workers are often hindered by 
similar constraints as aircraft work environments. 
Mean reaction time results from Loh, Lamond, Dorrian et al. are illustrated in 
Figure 4. The authors found that their results were in line with previous research, 
 14
specifically that “psychomotor vigilance performance during the 10-min PVT 
deteriorated with increasing wakefulness” (Loh et al., p. 342, 2004). Further, the authors 
found that for each measure; RT, optimum response, response in lapse and percentage 
lapse; the weakest performance was recorded at 0500 h. This finding corresponded with a 
natural circadian trough that generally occurs between 0400 and 0600 h.  
Figure 4.  Mean reaction times during the whole 10 min, the first 5 min,  
and the first 2 min of PVT. Error bars represent  
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Loh et al. (2004) 
Overall, the authors found that performance declined during the first 2 and 5 
minutes of the 10 min PVT. However, they caution that despite the results supporting the 
hypothesis that RTs “during the first half of a 10 min PVT are sensitive to the effects of 
sleep loss,” the RT metric suggests that the “sensitivity to sleep loss decreased with 
decreasing time on task” (Loh et al., p. 345, 2004). Concluding remarks suggest that 
while the shorter tests are valid, the 10 min test is preferable unless operationally not 
feasible. Operational studies default to 3 minute PVT due to constraints imposed on the 
researchers (Shattuck, Metsangas, Kenney, 2012). 
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E. COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING AND FATIGUE 
In their study, Rabinowitz, Breitbach, and Warner (2009) considered the 
relationship between fatigue and performance in the aviation community. Their criticisms 
of previous studies include the lack of inclusion of operational environments and the lack 
of the use of the tools FAST and SynWin, which measure predicted effectiveness and 
neurocognitive functioning respectively (Rabinowitz et al., 2009). Their study included 
predicted effectiveness, predicted fatigue levels, and neurocognitive functioning in a 
deployed environment.  
Rabinowitz et al. (2009) and Shay (1998) conclude  that decisions and judgments 
can have life-and-death consequences and that events occurring as a result of sleep 
deprivation can include “catastrophic operational failure, fratricide and other accidental 
deaths, and otherwise preventable noncombatant casualties” (Shay, 1998, p. 97). The 
need to identify, manage, and adapt to cognitive fatigue becomes critical when 
considered in light of crew or personnel safety (Miller & Firehammer, 2007; Rabinowitz 
et al., 2009). Several causes for the decrease in functioning were identified; these include 
poor sleep quality, restricted sleep opportunities and prolonged sleep deprivation 
(Rabinowitz et al. 2009). 
Rabinowitz et al. (2009) found that fatigue is a pervasive problem in aviation 
units and should not be assessed by examining quantity of sleep alone. Further, the 
authors found that the cognitive functioning of the aviators was significantly associated 
with the individual’s alertness and effectiveness prior to the flight. They advocate for the 
use of tools such as SynWin to identify individuals whose neurocognitive functioning 
may be affected by sleep restrictions or deprivation but “possess an inherent aptitude for 
the task demands of flying” (Rabinowitz et al., 2009, p. 361). The highlight of the report 
was the recommendation to include SynWin data in the initial recruitment of personnel in 
addition to traditional pencil-and-paper testing which typically only explores IQ factors 
and personality traits. SynWin may have the potential to help identify individuals who 




Endurance is described as “a state or quality of lasting or duration” (Webster, 
2015). From a military perspective, consideration of endurance is distinct from 
performance and fatigue, referring to a crew’s ability to sustain a certain level of 
performance over a given time period. The United States Coast Guard developed specific 
guidelines to maintain best practices for crew endurance, of which performance is an 
output. The Crew Endurance Management Practices Guidelines developed by the United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) outlined the importance of endurance, specifically that the 
responsibility of maintaining it lies with “vessel captains, department heads, mates, as 
well as with crewmembers” (USCG, 2003, p. 1). The USCG (2003) described crew 
endurance as “the ability to maintain performance within safety limits while enduring 
job-related physiological, psychological, and environmental changes” (p. 3). The 
definition becomes critical when attempting to provide a holistic approach to crew 
performance in the maritime and operational environment.  
With sailors being the Navy’s greatest strength (Miller & Firehammer, 2007), it is 
evident that increasing effort has been afforded to facilitate better work practices in order 
to sustain crew members’ endurance. Militaries provide a unique environment where 
human capital can rarely be replaced quickly. Operational capability takes priority at all 
times and crew endurance in order to fulfill that capability is critical. Crew size is 
determined by manpower requirements specific for the platform and operation, whether it 
be war or non-warlike operations, humanitarian assistance, or other tasks. If changing 
crew is not possible, the alternatives for improving existing crew endurance is enhancing 
productivity or improving performance (Ryan, 2014). Miller and Firehammer (2007) 
suggest that performance is improved by minimizing fatigue exhibited by crew members. 
Strategies to minimize fatigue at the command and crew level include enforced periods of 




Polysomnography is scientific quantification of sleep that involves data from 
electroencephalogry (EEG), oxygen levels in the blood, heart rate and breathing patterns, 
and eye and leg movements (Mayo Clinic, 2015). In most cases polysomnography is used 
in clinical environments to monitor “sleep stages and cycles to identify if or when your 
sleep patterns are disrupted and why” (Mayo Clinic, 2015). Replacing the traditional 
polysomnography (PSG), actigraphy can record for varying periods of time: 24 hours, 
weeks, or even longer. Wrist worn actigraphy has been used for over thirty years to study 
sleep and wake patterns in field studies in which polysomnographic studies are too 
difficult. Actigraphy provides the researcher with useful estimates of duration and quality 
of sleep in a cost-effective, non-invasive manner. “Insomnia, circadian sleep-wake 
disturbances, and periodic limb movement disorder” are some of the sleep conditions that 
can be monitored using actigraphy (Broughton, Fleming, & Fleetham, 1996). The small 
device is most commonly used on the wrist; however, the trunk of the body and the ankle 
can also be used if operationally required.  
One disadvantage of actigraphy is the potential for incorrect categorization of 
periods of activity or sleep following periods of inactivity. This issue can result in 
measurement errors if the individuals’ role requires them to remain stationary for 
extended periods of time. To overcome this problem, sleep researchers recommend 
comparing actigraphic data with self-reported diaries of sleep and wake times. The use of 
sleep diaries is an important adjunct to field studies but care must be taken since self-
reported sleep may overestimate the amount of sleep received. Ryan (2014) suggested 
that a self-reported sleep diary alone also does not account for the quality of the sleep in 
an objective manner.  
H. SLEEP, ACTIVITY, FATIGUE, AND TASK EFFECTIVENESS MODEL (SAFTE) 
Designed by Hursh and colleagues (2004a), the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task 
Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model was developed to assist the U.S Department of Defense in 
identifying sleep-related problems in performance and to assist in developing 
“operational planning schedule based on hypothetical work-rest-sleep schedules” (Hursh 
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et al., 2004a). The model is highly suitable for use in the defense environment due to its 
ability to predict an individual’s effectiveness given their past, present and future work-
rest schedule (Hursh et al., 2004a).  
The SAFTE Model has several advantages over other attempts to model sleep and 
fatigue (AFRL, 2003). Its key features are easily aligned with the complexities of watch 
schedules or military capability requirements. Among the advantages, the model accounts 
for changes in time zone or shift changes, predicts that sleep inertia is proportional to 
sleep debt, “predicts circadian variations in sleep quality”, and “predicts performance 
limitations under schedules that include daytime sleep” (AFRL, 2003).  
The model describes the influence of circadian processes on cognitive 
effectiveness and sleep regulation. Figure 5 shows the schematic of the SAFTE model. 
According to Hursh et al. (2004a) the sleep reservoir in the lower center of the figure is 
“the core of the model.” This block represents the individual’s capacity to undertake 
cognitive work. The reservoir is filled as the individual experiences a sleeping period. 
The level within the reservoir depends on the intensity and quality of the sleep 
experienced. The reservoir reduces as the individual works or is awake. The intensity of 
sleep within the schematic can be calculated from the individual’s circadian rhythm and 
the sleep debt, which is the “current level within the reservoir” (Hursh et al. 2004b). The 
quality of sleep is impacted by the features on the left of the diagram; these factors are 
mostly external, and may be outside the control of the individual. The right hand side of 
the model illustrates the predicted measure of effectiveness for the individual based on 
the input from the left hand side. The model shows that performance effectiveness is the 
output. The “level of effectiveness is simultaneously modulated by time-of-day 
(circadian) effects and the level of the sleep reservoir” (Hursh et al. 2004b, p. A45). The 
final term in the model, inertia, refers to the post-sleep decay of performance.  
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Figure 5.  Schematic of SAFTE simulation model  
 
Source: Hursh et al. (2004a) 
I. FATIGUE AVOIDANCE SCHEDULING TOOL (FAST) 
The Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) is a software program that is 
based upon the SAFTE model. The program estimates average effects of schedules on 
human performance, in effect, taking the 72-hour sleep history to predict an individual’s 
alertness level or “predicted effectiveness.” Work and sleep data are entered in graphic 
and text formats and a work schedule is promulgated with a traffic light system (green, 
amber or red) of classification. The system allows average predicted effectiveness for the 
measured work periods to be extracted and analyzed. The system creates predictions 
based on an algorithm derived from over two decades of data collected from the U.S. 
Army, U.S. Air Force and Canadian researchers (AFRL, 2003). FAST allows for the 
computation of several metrics for each individual. It can calculate an individual’s 
circadian rhythm, lapse likelihood index, or predicted effectiveness and can compare 
predicted effectiveness values to a blood alcohol concentration (BAC). The tool has been 
shown to be highly effective in facilitating the optimization of human performance under 
constrained conditions, which are inherent in maritime operational environments. 
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Figure 6 is an illustration of a FAST chart. The top axis of the display is the date, 
while time in 24-hour periods is given at the bottom axis. Rest and work activities 
experienced by the individual are indicated by the blue and red bars respectively on the 
bottom of the chart. The left hand scale ranges from 0 to 100 percent and indicates 
predicted (ranges from) level of effectiveness for the individual. The traffic light color 
bands indicate predicted effectiveness or performance levels. Red “indicates an 
individual’s predicted effectiveness is less than 65%; the yellow band indicates predicted 
levels of greater than 65% but less than 90%; and the green band is predicted 
effectiveness greater than 90%” (Miller, Matsangas & Shattuck, 2007, p. 241). An 
optimal level of predicted effectiveness is achieved in the green band. 
The BAC calculated by FAST is shown on the right hand vertical axis when 
selected on the schedule display (Figure 6). The BAC levels illustrated by FAST should 
be used with caution when evaluating predicting effectiveness of the individual. The 
BAC scale is included to provide a commonly recognized point of reference for cognitive 
impairment. The FAST software program points out that the BAC should not be viewed 
as a precise description of a situation or individual’s performance.  
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Figure 6.  FAST Chart  
 
Adapted from: Miller et al. (2007) 
The lapse index is another tool in the FAST graphical display. Lapses in FAST 
are described as excessively long reaction times. These long reaction times could be 
associated with the commonly used term, ‘micro-sleep’ where an individual falls asleep 
against their will and often, without warning. In well-rested individuals, the average daily 
lapse index would range between 0.2 and 1.5. As the individual’s predicted effectiveness 
decreases, the probability of lapses increase since lapses are the inverse of effectiveness. 
An individual with an effectiveness of seventy percent would correspond to a lapse index 
of five; that is, the chance of experiencing lapses is five times more likely than a well-
rested person during the average day.  
Heisinger (2009) described the FAST software as having the familiarity of a 
Microsoft Windows application and suggests it is user friendly and intuitive. FAST can 
provide additional objectivity to performance management for command teams. The tool 
allows planners to schedule crew work-rest patterns effectively to minimize operational 
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risks connected with fatigue. FAST can also be used retrospectively to analyze incidents 
or mishaps where fatigue is suspected as playing a role (Hursh et al., 2004a). Details of 
the individuals involved can be input and analyzed including sleep habits, schedules, and 
quality of sleep (Heisinger, 2009). The tool can be analyzed in conjunction with self-
reported sleep diaries and ships’ diaries to gain a more holistic picture of the events 
leading up to the incident at hand and the incident itself.  
J. NAVAL MANAGEMENT DIARY 
The Naval Management Diary (NMD) is an Information Communications 
Technology (ICT) system developed for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) that aids in 
increasing efficiencies in ship and crew management on board. The system attempts to 
provide a streamlined and automated reporting tool to RAN ships allowing them to focus 
on “warfighting and maritime operations in Australia and abroad” (K. Ryan, personal 
communication, September, 2, 2015). The system purports to integrate advanced fatigue 
tracking, watch keeping, and competency and currency management at the unit and fleet 
level. Further, the architecture allows input from other standalone systems that manage 
supporting information such as the human resources tool PMKeyS, and the urgent 
deficiency (maintenance and parts) tool AMPS (K. Ryan, personal communication, 
September, 2, 2015).  
The NMD provides a real-time, calendar-based, virtual environment that 
simplifies the units’ planning and management. Initial rollout of the system included 
HMA Ships Arunta, Parramatta, Gascoyne, and Canberra. This initial rollout sought 
feedback and suggestions from ship’s crew that has been evaluated and developed into 
the final rollout across the fleet. The prototype of the system provided the system’s 
architecture for the RAN Sustainable Workload Studies in HMAS Warramunga 
conducted by DSTO, and the data collection from the Armidale class patrol boats 
between August 2011 and December 2013. Individual crew members’ activities and sleep 
patterns were recorded during the study. The resulting NMD can help predict where 
individuals’ opportunity for sleep may encroach upon risk-of-fatigue guidelines (Navy 
Management Diary Guide, Mar 2015). 
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The NMD claims to have many benefits over traditional non-integrated systems. 
These claims include: 
 Visibility of personnel and proficiency information for appropriate 
allocation to events, 
 Ability to manage and track performance against RAN Collective Training 
targets, 
 An aggregated view of equipment deficiency information and effect on 
ship’s system, 
 Platform capability assessment data is available in a single repository, 
 Proactive management of risks associated with individual fatigue, 
 Integration with multiple source systems to reduce nugatory data input, 
improve data quality and streamline reporting, 
 Provision of shipboard metrics as an aid to decision-making, 
 Collection of seaworthiness and safety related data; and  
The NMD is capable of exchanging data with several other sources. This feature 
helps to minimize repetition in data and nugatory reporting. The interfaces operate with 
varying degrees of maturity. As of March 2015, interfaced systems included the Fleet 
Activity Schedule (FAMT), PMKeys – responsible for personnel, posting, proficiency, 
course, leave, and readiness data – AMPS, and Urgent Defect Corrective Maintenance 
database and the Navy Management Portal (NMP). The NMP interface with the NMD 
allows for twice daily exchanges of data between onshore and at sea vessel data (Navy 
Management Diary Guide, Mar 2015).  
By using the fatigue monitoring function built into the NMD, various metrics can 
be extracted. The Fatigue Summary tab allows a visual data set of risk assessments for 
activity periods to be populated. The left panel allows the user to select individual crew 
members. Risk assessments are categorized as low (P=0), Low-Medium (0<P<11), 
Medium-high (10<P<16), and High (P>15). The NMD display highlights all events, 
which are low-medium or higher.  
The fatigue summary can provide a snapshot to the command and other users for 
specific events and allocated personnel, or individual personnel across periods of time. 
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The NMD fatigue summary page is illustrated in Figure 7. An example of the Personnel 
Duty Times at Risk is in Figure 8. 
Figure 7.  Naval Management Diary Fatigue Summary page  
 
 
The fatigue summary function provides several metrics which are combined to 
calculate a Points score (P) which is translated into the risk ranges. The variables, from 
Figure 6 and the supporting algorithm are detailed below: 
X: Opportunity to sleep in the previous 24 hours 
Y: Opportunity to sleep in the previous 48 hours 
Z: Time since last opportunity to sleep 
P: 4(5-x)+2(12-y)+z = P 
Where the following rules apply:  
x=X<5 else x=0, y=Y if Y<12 else y=0 and z=Z-Y if Y<Z else z=0. 
Figure 8 shows an extract from the fatigue summary produced by the NMD for 
the CO during the simulation. Periods of activity are listed in the duty start time. These 
periods vary in length, the duration in noted in the sixth column. This extract illustrated 
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the different points score (P) associated with calculated risk for the period of time. The 
duty periods do not account for sleep that has occurred, only the opportunity to sleep 
external to the duty periods of activity.  The NMD does not schedule sleep, meaning that 
the fatigue summary relies solely on the opportunity to sleep in the previous 24 hours (X) 
and 48 hours (Y). 
Figure 8.  Naval Management Diary personnel duty times  
and associated risk 
 
 
The summary tool combines activities scheduled in the NMD Outlook function if 
there is not a time separation between the events. This means that several events or ship 
evolutions can be combined and will be read as a single duty period. The Outlook 
calendar, and subsequently the fatigue summary, do not record nor take into account the 
sleep of the individual. The fatigue summary is based on previous recorded periods of 
activity, within 48 hours from the conclusion of the activity being considered. This time 
period differs from the FAST model, which takes into account the previous 72 hour sleep 
history. 
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K. NAVY STANDARD WORK WEEK (NSWW) – RAN SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Navy Standard Work Week is described in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 
1000.16K (2007) and gives guidance for the usage of total force manpower across all 
naval ashore units. The OPNAV Instruction is used by the Naval Manpower Analysis 
Centre (NAVMAC) in conjunction with Type Commanders to determine manpower 
requirements. The Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) is a critical element within the 
Instruction that drives the units manning document (Department of Navy, 2007).  
The RAN has adopted a similar approach, designing their own version of a Navy 
Standard Work Week for the RAN. In 2015, the RAN conducted a workload study 
aboard HMAS Choules. The scenario was based on the completion of activities required 
by the platform to support a 90-day humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 
operational scenario. Within this scenario-based study, the Navy Standard Work Week, 
illustrated in Table 1, was utilized. 
Table 1.   Navy Standard Work Week (RAN) 
Hours in a Week 168.00 
Non-Available Time Sleep                               (8 hours x 7 days) -56.00 
 Messing                          (2 hours x 7 days) -14.00 
 Personal Time/Hygiene  (2 hours x 7 days) -14.00 
 Sunday Sea                     (3 hours x 1 day) -3.00 
Available Time (AT)  81.00 
Additional Service 
Allowance 
Training – Individual and Collective Training 
Allowance -7.00 
 
Service Diversion – Actions required by 
regulations or standard routine. Includes 
department musters, rounds, sick parade. 
-4.00 
Productive Time (PT)  70.00 
Source: HMAS Choules WORKLOAD – SCENARIO ANALYSIS (Attachment A to 
AB22501824) 
In the HMAS Choules scenario, it was assumed that the productive time available 
was 70 hours per person per week. The maintenance workload is allocated to enlisted 
sailors with the rank of Able Seaman (AB). This weekly average is applied to all 
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departments and work-centers and includes time used for corrective maintenance. The 
RAN NSWW also assumes that maintenance allocation is only given to Leading Seaman 
or senior enlisted if the allocated average time is exceeded. The remaining portion is 
allocated to the higher rank until the allocation is fully used. The NSWW model accounts 
for watch-keeping, maintenance, service diversion and training. However, the model does 
not account for day-to-day catering, medical duties, personnel administration or logistics 
support.  
The scenario analysis worked on several assumptions: 
1. All positions, RAN and Ship’s Army Department (SAD), are filled by 
appropriately qualified personnel. 
2. The minimum number of personnel required for the conduct of each 
activity/evolution is available from the watch and station bill or 
supplementary information provided by Choules.  
3. Watches are 1 in 3, and watch keepers are not utilized for other tasking in 
the scenario based simulation. 
4. Time is allocated as detailed in the proposed RAN Navy Standard Work 
Week in Table 1. 
The resulting workload for each individual per day is then aggregated into the 
operational phases across a 90-day HADR scenario. The average workload in terms of 
hours per day, is then calculated to generate a heat map for the positions that are 
operating at or close to capacity. The resulting aggregates are then averaged for the 
personnel types (Rank and Category/PQ): “This provides the hours a particular 
workgroup has to complete, this is then divided by the 70 hours productive time that is 
detailed in the Navy Standard Work Week and results in the number of personnel of a 
particular workgroup required to complete the designated activity” (Attachment A to 
AB22501824). The Choules workload scenario found that despite excessive workloads 
on particular MOSs/Categories, the averaged results indicate that the scheme of 




L. PREVIOUS US NAVY STUDIES OF SLEEP AT SEA AND NSWW 
A thesis by Haynes (2007) considered the work and rest periods experienced by 
sailors on USS Chung Hoon over an 18-day period in 2007. The sample included two 
officers and 23 enlisted sailors. Participants were from the Combat Systems, Engineering, 
and Operations departments. Haynes excluded the first two days of the study in order to 
gain a baseline for the data. This preconditioning period improved the validity of the 
FAST data which, under normal conditions, assumes a participant received “eight hours 
of excellent sleep for three days prior to the first studied day” (Haynes, p. 19, 2007). Data 
were collected through personal Activity Logs and Wrist Activity Monitors. The two sets 
of data were then validated against each other. Haynes used the NSWW categories as laid 
out in the Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures 
(OPNAVINST 1600.J). These NSWW categories included watch, maintenance, training, 
meeting, sleep, messing, personal, and Sunday free time. Haynes found that many sailors 
reported personal and Sunday free time as the same category, so these groups were 
combined in the analysis.  
A fully compliant sailor that has a work/rest structure according to the Navy 
Standard Work Week has a predicted effectiveness of 83.25% when calculated in FAST. 
Haynes (2007) found that only 41% of sailors participating in the study met this level of 
effectiveness, with 56% of participants having a predicted effectiveness less than 80%. 
Overall, 85% of participants exceeded the 81 hours of Available Time allocated by the 
Navy Standard Work Week. Haynes (2007) concludes with two significant 
recommendations for future studies. The first is to establish department-specific Navy 
Standard Work Weeks. The second recommendation was replication of the study using 
more participants and additional platforms in order to derive more accurate standard work 
weeks.  
Green (2009) investigated the Navy Standard Work Week aboard U.S. Navy 
frigates. Green used data collected from fifty sailors aboard the USS Rentz. The sailors 
varied in rates, ranks, watch stations and departments. Green utilized two methods of data 
collection, activity logs and wrist activity monitors (WAM). By combining the two 
methods, the author was able to validate the data more accurately. Participants were 
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asked to fill in a log divided into fifteen-minute segments using codes under two sections 
– available time and non-available time. The available section included categories for 
maintenance, training, meetings, watch stations, and service diversion, and categories of 
sleep, messing, personal time and Sunday free time for non-available time (Green, 2009, 
p. 20). Participants were asked to wear their WAM at all times unless an evolution 
prevented them from safely doing so. Participants were asked to record when they took 
the WAM off. WAM identification numbers were matched with Activity log 
identification numbers for ease of correlation.  
Final participants varied from initial volunteers in the Green study. Of the initial 
50 volunteers, only 24 completed Activity Logs. All participants in the final sample were 
male with the average age of 31. Green found that on average in a week, participants 
recorded 20.24 hours more time than allocated for maintenance and exceeded meeting 
(service diversion) allocation by 7.93 hours. Average personal time was recorded as 
higher than allocated by 9.29 per week. However, standing watch, sleep and mess 
exceeded weekly allotment in the NSWW by 16.56, 8.98, and 6.99 hours, respectively. 
Overall findings by Green for the Navy Standard Work Week and average allocated 
times are in Table 2.  
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Table 2.   Mann-Whitney U Means Test: Comparison of USS Rentz  
Weekly Averages to NSWW 
 
Source: Green (2009) 
Sixty-one percent of enlisted participants showed that available time was 
exceeded by the NSWW model (where 81 hours was allocated). (Green, 2009). Green 
found that the Engineering, Operations and Supply departments all exceed the NSWW 
allocated duty time (p. 31, 2009). Of the duty time categories, maintenance exceeded the 
allocated time for all three departments. The watch category was found to be under-
allocated in the engineering, supply and operations departments.  
Green investigated the sleep patterns recorded by participants against the NSWW 
Model utilizing FAST. Participants were categorized according to paygrade. Green’s 
results indicate that higher-ranked sailors “self-reported sleeping fewer hours than those 
of lower rank” (2009, p. 38). Green highlighted several individual cases where the 
predicted effectiveness was below optimal. Green contrasted below optimal cases with 
several cases where effectiveness was apparent, however, noting that participants were in 
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different departments, conducted different watches and the higher effectiveness 
individual had the opportunity to have 11 hours sleep prior to watch.  
Green (2009) discussed the limitations of the study, particularly the small sample 
size and the “extent to which the conclusions presented here can be extrapolated to larger 
populations” (2009, p. 48). Further the author noted that human error is possible when 
participants self-report their work and rest activity data. Finally, the author conceded that 
the dropout rate for the study was noteworthy. Fifty percent of original participants did 
not complete the study. Green noted that these individuals may have significantly 
different results from those found in the final sample.  
Haynes used a deviation formula which provided an absolute value; therefore, the 
difference in actual versus allocated time could not be interpreted as positive or negative, 
and could have been a combination of both. This differed from the methodology used by 
Green. Green’s (2009) results were similar to those found earlier by Haynes (2007), 
specifically that actual hours in the maintenance category were higher than the NSWW 
allocation. Haynes found that the Combat Systems department had the highest deviation 
in allocated maintenance hours (11 hours), and concluded that the Navy Standard Work 
Week “does not adequately capture the required maintenance performed by Combat 
Systems personnel” (2007, p. 25).  
The Green (2009) and Haynes (2007) studies contributed to the military-specific 
literature regarding sleep and fatigue in the maritime environment. Both studies dealt 
with small sample groups of participants. Similar to the Australian collection on the 
ACPB, Green identified participant drop out as a flaw of the study. Haynes did not report 
this specific negative detail but did suggest that self-reported data posed some concerns.  
M. PREVIOUS ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY STUDIES OF SLEEP AT SEA 
RAN has conducted two sleep studies on surface ships. The people-focused work 
practices initiative from the RAN’s New Generation Program led the Chief of Navy to 
investigate ‘what if’ scenarios as they pertain to fatigue management at sea. The 
investigation was conducted by the Australian Defence Science and Technology 
Organization. The resulting report highlights the obfuscation of the environmental, 
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cultural, and behavioral aspects and the recognition of fatigue as a safety critical problem 
(Royal Australian Navy 2011 Terms of Reference for NGN Project 13 – people focused 
work practices monitor load carried by the individual, Navy, N.G., Editor. Canberra).  
1. HMAS Warramunga 
The HMAS Warramunga study was significant in size; work and sleep patterns of 
one hundred and sixty two members were followed over a four-month period (Grech, 
Roberts, Hamilton, Turner & Cleary, 2014). Following a review of the scientific 
literature, the report went on to describe the methodology used in the study. The crew 
was divided into four groups in order to provide anonymity and improve group sample 
size. The observational study occurred while the platform was undergoing pre-
deployment training (work-up) and assessment, and continued during deployment afloat. 
Members of the study wore wrist activity monitors (WAMs), and specific device 
download time was built into the study. Participants were requested to press the event 
marker on their sleep watch prior to commencing sleep and upon waking. The report 
notes that this process was not consistent among participants (p. 10) and contributed to 
error in the data. However, the report goes on to suggest that data fidelity was increased 
by the use of watches that enabled light levels to be recorded (p. 10).  
The DSTO report focused on total sleep time (TST) and total work time (TWT). 
Further analysis was conducted on the sleep duration, work hours, and indicative fatigue 
variables between groups, rankings, and departments (p. 12). The DSTO report found all 
groups to have recorded mean average TST values of less than seven hours during the sea 
phase of the trial. A single FAST model based on the average daily TST of the entire 
crew was calculated to approximate average fatigue risk and to highlight the potential 
impact of work and rest patterns on the ship’s crew. The mean TWT increased 
significantly for all groups at sea (11.2±3.1 h) compared to time alongside (9.4±2.8 h). 
The report also found that Senior Sailors and Senior Officers had the highest mean TWT 
while at sea (p. 43). The report suggested that daily sleep was most impacted by 
operational or mission requirements and operational tempo. Finally, the report conceded 
several limitations; amongst them: 
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1. The NMD is capable of interactive changes; however, during the report 
period, the diary presented schedule working hours as opposed to actual 
working hours, 
2. The modelling tools were limited in scope. Only 25% of the crew were 
included in the fatigue risk analysis. Secondly, some tools assumed that 
sleep had been sufficient on previous days, or marked missing sleep 
periods as zero – subsequently “affecting the cognitive effectiveness / 
fatigue scores calculated,” 
3. The authors concede that the volume of data created challenges in coding 
– “particularly the absolute accuracy of the coding of individual sleep 
intervals,” and 
4. Raw actigraphic data were not adjusted or corrected for sea state or ship 
motion. 
2. Armidale Class Patrol Boat Data Collection  
A second RAN study focused on a much smaller ship and her crew. The Armidale 
Class Patrol Boat (ACPB) was introduced into service in the Royal Australian Navy in 
2005. Typical ACPB operations include patrol in the northern waters off Australia in the 
Indian Ocean, South Pacific Ocean and Arafura Sea. The introduction of the purpose-
built vessels also saw the introduction of the multi-crew system within the ACPB 
community. At the time of introduction, Chief of Navy Senior Advisory Committee 
(CNSAC), noted that the multi-crew system would “reduce system risk and provide[s] 
flexibility to cope with the impact of increased operational tempo and scope to manage 
operational relief from within the crewing solution” (ACPB Introduction into service 
information packet). Key points from the crew management environment created by 
multi-crewing include: 
 Annual leave (35 days) available to be used during the course of the year 
in which it was earned, 
 Certainty within the operational program to allow planning towards the 
use of leave entitlement and other activities, 
 Certainty of operational program to allow training to the undertaken. 
Opportunities to plan for training to assist promotion, personal 
developments and continuation operational training, 
 Provide the majority of training opportunities delivered in the homeport. 
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Actigraphy (sleep) data, RAN NMD records, and twice daily 3-minute PVTs were 
collected on volunteer participants in November and December 2013 onboard an ACPB 
undergoing typical operations. Although personally identifiable indicators were not 
specifically collected in the data, Personnel Management Key Solution (PMKeyS) 
(identification numbers) were recorded. PMKeyS data include a demographic profile of 
the individual as well as other management information including training proficiencies, 
and deployment history. It was decided that activity diaries would not be kept for the data 
collection period (Hamilton, S. personal communication, September, 7, 2015). 
Actigraphy and psychomotor vigilance test (PVT) data were collected using 
Motionlogger II, borrowed from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. The data were 
recorded and downloaded using Actiware software; formal analysis could not be 
completed because there were significant issues with participant compliance that were 
not initially recognized.  
Several limitations of the ACPB data collection were identified. The sample 
population was small. Of the potential 21 crew members, actigraphy data were collected 
for only 13 participants. This data set was further diluted by poor compliance. Several 
participants dropped out from the data collection, and others were inconsistent in wearing 
the wrist monitors. Similar to the data collected by Grech et al., (2014), participants for 
the ACPB collection were asked to use an event marker to indicate the beginning and end 
of sleep periods. However, this procedure was not followed by many of the participants, 
making the actigraphy less easy to interpret and contributing to inaccuracy. 
The data were further undermined by the lack of secondary supporting data such 
as sleep diaries. As previously noted, the NMD was used to record ship and individual 
events. However, the practice was often predictive rather than reactive; that is, data were 
not always updated to reflect actual events as opposed to planned events. Further, sleep 
and rest periods were not recorded in the NMD, making it difficult to match with the 
actigraphy data. Provision of the watch bill may have also helped validation of actigraphy 
data but it was not available. The operational tempo experienced by ACPBs was not 
adequately described by the NMD alone. Performance battery tests (PVT) were also  
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taken inconsistently and were therefore less useful than desired. All of these issues 
combined together forced the decision to simulate a crew rather than to use the flawed 




























The methodology used in this thesis attempts to overcome the shortcomings of 
both the HMAS Warramunga and the ACPB data collection by simulating the work and 
rest schedules of an entire crew for a three-week underway period in a ‘best case’ 
scenario. It builds on the lessons learned from U.S. Navy studies and uses the FAST tool 
to validate the RAN’s NSWW and NMD. Several of the issues identified by Haynes 
(2007) and Green (2009) were considered during the data simulation for this research. 
Simulation of data for an entire crew overcame the potential issue of participant dropout. 
The Microsoft Outlook simulation entered all activities for the individual crew members 
in an attempt to overcome the errors associated with self-reported data. Sleep periods of 
six and eight hours were simulated for all crew members to allow for comparison 
between two sleep allowance levels. 
This thesis simulated the 21-member crew structure of a Royal Australian Navy 
Armidale Class Patrol Boat (ACPB) for a 3-week underway period. This crew included 
three officers (Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and Navigator), and a senior 
enlisted sailor (Chief Petty Officer– Marine Technical (CPO-MT); the remaining were 
enlisted sailors varying in rank and department. Crew organizational charts are 
represented in Table 3 and Figure 9. In addition to the three officers, the Command 
Department included a Petty Officer Coxswain. The Technical Department consisted of 
the CPO-MT, a Leading Seaman-Electrical Technician, two Able Seaman-Marine 
Technician, and two Able Seaman-Electrical Technician. The Operations Department 
consisted of a Petty Officer-Bosun, two Leading Seaman-Bosun Mates, four Able 
Seaman-Bosun Mates, one Leading Seaman Communication Information Systems, and 
one Able Seaman-Communication Information Systems technician. The Supply 
Department included a Leading Seaman Cook, and an Able Seaman Cook. The simulated 
data from the activities in the 3-week underway period modeled in the current scenario 




Table 3.   Armidale Class Patrol Boat Scheme of Complement 
Commanding	Officer	 C	 LCDR	SMN	
XO/Boarding Officer C LEUT SMN 
Navigator B LEUT
Chief Boatswain Mate & 
I/C Boarding Team 1 
C/B POB 
2 I/C Boarding Team 1 B LSB
Weapons B LSB 
2 I/C Boarding team 2 B LS/PONPC
Boarding Party C/B ABBM 
Boarding Party B ABBM
Gunners Yeoman B ABBM 
Boarding Party B ABBM
Senior Technical Officer C CPO/POMT 
Maintainer C LSMT (E)
Maintainer C LS/ABET 
Maintainer B ABMT
Maintainer B ABET (W) 
Maintainer B ABET
Communications C LSCIS 
Communications B ABCIS
Cook C AB/LSCK 
Cook B ABCK
C=Core ships steaming crew are minimum complement required to sail ship as required by                                                  
IMO (9 personnel) 
B= Members of Boarding Party/Steaming Party or Boats crew 
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Figure 9.  Organizational Chart—Simulated Armidale Class  





A. SIMULATED NAVAL MANAGEMENT DIARIES AND THE PROPOSED NAVY 
STANDARD WORK WEEK 
An activity diary was simulated in the Royal Australian Navy’s Navy 
Management Diary (NMD) using the Microsoft Outlook function in the NMD, shown in 
Figure 10. Each simulated crew member was assigned typical duties, meetings, and 
watches depending on category and specialization (MOS equivalent). NMD schedules 
were created for 21 crew members across four departments: Command, Technical, 
Supply, and Operational, similar to actual operations. Not all crew members stood watch. 
Evolutions, activities, and tasks were created based on rank and department. Some 
evolutions were deemed ‘whole-ship,’ in which everyone in the crew participated.  Watch 
standards were applied based on previous NMD data.  
An Excel spreadsheet was constructed from the NMD data that divided each crew 
member’s day into 15 minute increments for the entire 3-week underway period. Sleep 
periods were not included in the Outlook data but were included in the corresponding 
Excel data. It was assumed that the majority of the sleep occurred between 2100 h and 
0600 h. Where watch schedules permitted, sleep was programmed during these times. If 
watch schedules interfered with programming of eight hours in a 24-hour period, from 
0000 h to 2359 h, the additional sleep hours were allocated to the day before. The average 
sleep was calculated per day to be as close to eight hours as possible without relying on 
daytime naps. 
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Figure 10.  Example of Outlook Diary for simulated crew member 
 
 
Using the simulated organizational structure and associated ship activities, 
calculations were generated for each ‘participant’, yielding total hours of each NSWW 
category, and also available, non-available, and productive time.  The data from the 
NMD were transcribed into an activity log in Excel. Evolutions and activities were coded 
according to Table 4.  
Table 4.   Evolution and Activity Codes 
 
Maintenance (MA) Watch (1) Training (T) Meeting 
(ME) 
Mess (M) 






































The activity log was divided into fifteen-minute sections to allow for short 
meetings and evolutions, shown in Figure 11. Evolutions were coded as training, mess, 
meeting, maintenance, watch, and personal. All codes, except personal, were calculated 
as fifteen-minute intervals. Personal time was calculated as 24 hours minus all other 
allocations. For each participant, daily totals, daily averages, 3-week period totals, and 3-
week period averages were calculated. The NMD produces a point value for the risk 
associated with the previous 48-hours of scheduled activity. This point value corresponds 
with the promulgated risk level for the crew member during a given period of activity. 
Point values and associated risk are defined as low risk (P=0), low-medium (0<P<11), 
medium-high (10<P<16), and high risk (P>15). Based on the periods of activity, the 
metrics provided from the NMD included duration of event, time start and end of the 
event, hours of opportunity to sleep in the previous 24 hours since the conclusion of the 
event, opportunity to sleep in the last 48 hours since the conclusion of the event, time 
since last opportunity to sleep, and the risk points calculated by NMD relating to the 
events.  
Figure 11.  Simulated Sleep and Activity Log (NSWW) –  
Royal Australian Navy Armidale Class Patrol Boat 
 
 
The U.S. Navy Standard Work Week and the workload allocation utilized in the 
HMAS Choules study were combined to evaluate the simulated data of the ACPB 
community. Of the 168 hours available per week, 81 hours were allocated to non-
available time. This amount includes 56 hours for sleep, 14 hours mess and, 14 hours 
personal time combined with three hours Sunday sea time. Available time was divided 
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into seven hours training (collective and individual) and four hours service diversion. 
Productive time was 14 hours allocated to maintenance and 56 hours to watch (formal 
watch bill). Some ad hoc watch periods were allocated to crew members depending on 
the specific evolution.  
NMD analysis utilized the simulated eight-hour sleep schedules for this 
component based on the U.S. Navy Standard Work Week and the workload studies 
conducted on HMAS Choules (as shown in Table 1).  
B. SIMULATED ACPB CREW—SIX AND EIGHT HOUR SLEEP PROFILES IN FAST 
Using the simulated activities from the NMD for each crew member, FAST plots 
were generated to produce ‘predicted effectiveness’ for the entire 3-week period divided 
into 30-minute increments. Since sleep is not set apart explicitly in the NMD, the 
decision was made to run sets of FAST plots for each crew member. The first set of plots 
assumed that the crew member had received six hours of sleep in each 24 period; the 
second set of plots assumed eight hours of sleep per night. FAST schedules were coded 
as work or sleep. Some schedules had several nap periods during daylight hours due to 
increased watch schedules. These naps were coded as ‘poor’ sleep, compared to the sleep 
during night hours, which were coded in FAST as ‘good’ sleep.  
The summary tables were collected for each ‘participant’ based on six or eight 
hours sleep. The ‘tabular view’ option in FAST provided several metrics for each 
participant at six and eight hours sleep, namely date, time, lat/long of vessel position, 
light, effectiveness, and dummy codes for sleep and work (0,1).  The tabular view in 
FAST was programmed to give predicted effectiveness at 30-minute intervals.  
C. VALIDATION OF NAVAL MANAGEMENT DIARY USING SIMULATED ACPB CREW 
The data were entered into FAST with Darwin, Australia as the location (lat: 
12:25:S, long: 130:53:E). The data were entered for the period 10 November 2013 
through to 30 November 2013. These dates were used to replicate the time period for the 
actigraphy data collection for the ACPB community in 2013.   
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Each period of activity from the NMD was compared to the predicted 
effectiveness calculated by FAST for the corresponding time period, or as close to the 
thirty-minute interval as possible. The FAST scores included the overall average for the 
NMD time interval, the lowest predicted effectiveness level for the interval, and the 
highest predicted effectiveness. The lowest and highest predicted effectiveness were 
confirmed by visual inspection of FAST plots. Additional FAST data for each event used 
included the minimum predicted effectiveness value within the period of activity or duty, 
and the range of predicted effect during the period of activity. The periods of activity 
recorded in the NMD and subsequently used in the fatigue summary were generally 
larger, grouping several daily tasks together, when compared to FAST, which grouped 
them in smaller periods. The time format of the ‘periods of activity’ in the NMD was 
compared to the 30-minute interval predicted effectiveness generated by FAST in order 
to gain data covering 24 hours for the entire three weeks.   
Modelling techniques using JMP (JMP12) were then used to analyze the NMD 
risk profiles against the predicted effectiveness and associated risk calculated by FAST. 
The five crew members selected from the simulation yielded 443 ‘periods of activity’ 
from the corresponding NMD activities. Of these periods, four were excluded from the 
analysis due to erroneous coding within NMD (where P=0, Risk≠Low). A total of 439 
periods of activity were used. FAST ‘risk’ for each period of activity was calculated 
where FASTP = FAST Predicted Effectiveness (8-hours)<77.5%, otherwise no risk. A 
second set of data was created and entitled FAST 6. FAST 6 was calculated using NMD 
‘period of activity’, FAST six hours sleep and minimum predicted effectiveness of less 
than 77.5 %. FAST ‘risk’=(minimum predicted effectiveness<77.5%). NMD risk levels 




IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. SIMULATED NAVAL MANAGEMENT DIARIES AND THE PROPOSED NAVY 
STANDARD WORK WEEK 
The first methodology utilized in this thesis aimed to investigate the validity of 
the proposed RAN Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) in a seagoing environment. The 
results found that overall the NSWW and its categories allocation time did not accurately 
match the time spent on typical activities by Armidale Patrol Class Boat (ACPB) crew 
members.  
Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) averages for all crew members were 
calculated to identify sailors which exceeded the allocated hours for each work category 
(watch, maintenance, etc.). The simulation results show an underestimation of the 
productive time used by sailors. The intended formula for productive time assumes 56 
hours per crew member of watch time. This amount was not found in the simulation as all 
crew members experienced an underused watch allocation. Conversely, maintenance was 
generally in excess of the NSWW allocation. Ranging from -36.08h to +9.25h, the excess 
in allocated time for maintenance for technical sailors was highlighted. Larger 
deficiencies were noted for the Able Seaman Cook and Leading Seaman Cook. However, 
this finding is due to food preparation activity being coded as maintenance. Both these 
crew members were exempt from machine, engine, or ship maintenance and watch 
keeping in the simulation. Their allocation of maintenance relates only to the core 
function of their MOS.  
Allocated time for messing was found to be deficient in the simulation although 
this finding was not considered significant for several reasons. Firstly, standard watch 
keeping times often interfere with meal serving times, and where this occurred in the 
simulation, additional eating time was not allocated to the member. Anecdotal evidence 
would suggest when this occurs in a real environment; meals are kept for the watch 
personnel and set aside. Trivia night, as a ship’s morale activity, was also coded as mess 
hours. This evolution ran for ninety minutes and would account for several instances of 
individual crew member deficiency in the average week. The training category was also 
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inclined to be overestimated. Activities such as compulsory physical training, and 
individual and collective training were all coded as training. The simulated schedules did 
not distinguish between attending and conducting training.  
Table 5 illustrates the weekly averages for each NSWW category. The averages 
showed that no sailor exceed the allocated hours for standing watch (allocation of 56 
hours); however, several sailors exceeded the hours allocated for maintenance, training 
and messing.  

















CO 15.42 35.67 8.33 8.08 54.75 17.00 28.75
XO 16.42 25.42 9.50 16.92 47.42 15.92 36.42
NAV 49.08 8.17 4.08 7.75 55.92 13.58 29.42
CPO 8.33 50.08 3.67 9.83 56.00 17.67 22.42
ABMT 32.08 29.08 5.33 4.33 53.75 15.08 28.33
LSBM 50.75 5.75 9.25 4.00 55.08 13.00 30.17
LSCK 2.75 40.83 3.58 2.08 56.00 18.50 44.25
ABBM 35.83 9.33 10.25 5.08 53.25 13.00 41.25
ABBM 36.83 6.25 11.00 5.83 54.50 13.58 40.00
ABBM 34.92 5.83 9.08 5.33 54.67 13.42 44.75
ABCIS 3.92 9.58 8.25 5.25 55.83 17.00 68.17
ABET 29.33 15.00 5.58 2.00 55.42 13.33 47.33
LSET 31.33 17.00 5.83 3.92 56.67 13.92 39.33
ABMT 31.33 23.83 3.75 4.00 51.25 11.67 42.17
POB 37.17 6.75 8.17 3.92 53.08 13.92 45.00
PONPC 37.33 4.75 6.50 4.25 51.00 13.08 51.08
ABCK 2.42 40.00 3.83 1.92 56.00 17.67 46.17
ABET 24.58 9.50 1.42 1.67 52.08 9.92 68.83
LSB 36.08 6.75 3.92 3.83 56.08 13.58 47.75
ABBM 34.08 5.08 5.00 5.17 56.00 14.50 48.17
LSCIS 3.25 8.08 2.58 3.75 56.00 18.25 76.08  
 
Formal watch keeping hours were typically allocated to Operations Department 
sailors, in addition to the Navigator, Executive Officer and Commanding Officer. The 
Leading Seaman Bosun recorded the highest number of watch hours (50.75hrs). Other 
senior sailors also recorded high watch keeping hours, 37.17 and 37.33; however, both 
were under the NSWW allocation of 56 hours. Watch hours amongst the junior sailors 
within the department were evenly spread with 35.83, 36.83, 34.92, and 34.08 hours (IDs 
10, 11, 12, 20, respectively). Of the officers, the Navigator conducted 49.08 hours of 
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watch on average in the three-week simulation. Ship activities were coded as watch in 
addition to the tradition watch keeping on the bridge.  
Eleven (over 50 %) of the crew members exceeded the allocated NSWW time for 
conducting meetings, with a RAN NSWW allocation of four hours per week. The highest 
deficiency was see in the Executive Officer who had several meeting periods allocated to 
weekly books and administration tasks.  
The weekly averages showed that maintenance allocation was exceeded by 
several crew members, particularly within the Technical Department, shown in Table 6. 
The Chief Petty Officer (CPO) who is the senior technical officer onboard, exceeded the 
NSWW allocation for maintenance by 36.08 hours.    
Table 6.   Difference* in simulated activity and NSWW for technical department 
CREW MEMBER WATCH MAINTENANCE TRAINING MEETING SLEEP MESS PERSONAL
CPO 47.67 ‐36.08 3.33 ‐5.83 0.00 ‐3.67 ‐5.42
ABMT 23.92 ‐15.08 1.67 ‐0.33 2.25 ‐1.08 ‐11.33
ABET 26.67 ‐1.00 1.42 2.00 0.58 0.67 ‐30.33
LSET 24.67 ‐3.00 1.17 0.08 ‐0.67 0.08 ‐22.33
ABMT 24.67 ‐9.83 3.25 0.00 4.75 2.33 ‐25.17
ABET 31.42 4.50 5.58 2.33 3.92 4.08 ‐51.83  
 
*Difference calculated as NSWW-simulated weekly average 
B. SIMULATED ACPB CREW—SIX AND EIGHT HOUR SLEEP PROFILES IN FAST 
The second methodology utilized NMD activities and FAST periods of work and 
sleep to calculate predicted effectiveness. Overall, the results found that the Command 
Department was at risk of severe degradation in average predicted effectiveness across 
the 3-week period. Officers and senior sailors in the Command Department recorded four 
of the six lowest average predicted effectiveness levels over the 3-week period. The 
overall average predicted effectiveness for the crew ranged from 83.65 % to 90.86 %.  
FAST plots were created for each sailor for six and eight hours of simulated sleep. 
These provide a visual indication of the degradation in performance resulting from the 
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two hours less sleep and highlight a decrease in performance when only six hours of 
sleep is simulated.  
Using the summary tables from FAST, average effectiveness was calculated for 
each crew member (see Appendix F). These results assume an average of eight hours 
daily sleep throughout the 3-week period. The tables also illustrate the average predicted 
effectiveness for sleep, work and wake intervals. These results suggest that the Executive 
Officer had the lowest average predicted effectiveness for the period. In addition to the 
lowest average predicted effectiveness, the Executive Officer also had the lowest 
recorded predicted effectiveness levels for work, sleep, and wake intervals.  
Sailors from the Supply and Communication Departments had the highest average 
predicted effectiveness scores across all the time periods and intervals of the 3-week 
simulation. The Leading Seaman (CIS) sailor had the highest average predicted 
effectiveness for periods of activity classified as work for the simulation, assuming eight 
hours sleep. The Leading Seaman Cook sailor had the highest predicted effectiveness 
averages for sleep and wake periods. Average predicted effectiveness summaries did not 
suggest a single department was more or less effective than another.  
Cooks (Supply Department) and CIS Junior sailors (Communications 
Department) had the highest predicted effectiveness overall. Crew members in these 
departments had regular and ‘good’ sleep patterns allocated in the simulation. Work 
activities generally took place during daylight hours and sleep was generally continuous 
for the six and eight hours nightly sleep allocation.  
Comparison of FAST results with six and eight simulated hours of sleep provided 
further insight into the degradation of performance with decreasing sleep. The simulated 
schedule of the crew’s Navigator showed several days across the time period where 
predicted effectiveness exceeded ninety percent, at Figure 12 blue boxes. The eight-hour 
sleep simulation resulted in instances of increased Lapse Likelihood Index from 
acceptable levels, peaking on several occasions with a Lapse Likelihood Index of 
between seven and eight, see in Figure 12, red box.  
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Figure 12.  Navigator simulated FAST schedule with 8 hours assumed sleep 
 
 
The same schedule with six hours sleep illustrated a drop in predicted 
effectiveness that was unable to be regained by the conclusion of the simulation. With 
only six hours of sleep per night, the Navigator dropped in predicted effectiveness after 
the second day below ninety percent, and on some days had predicted effectiveness levels 
below sixty percent, shown in blue boxes in Figure 13. With the same schedule and six 
hours allocated sleep, the results show peaks of Lapse Likelihood Index in excess of 10, 








The Leading Seaman CIS sailor is an example of a crew member whose role is 
predominately as a day-hand. Very little tasking occurred prior to 0700 h or after 1900 h. 
With eight hours of sleep, the crew member gained an average predicted effectiveness of 
90.37 %. The predicted effectiveness for the work interval was simulated at 94.02 %, 
while the sleep interval was estimated at 85.24. The day-hand simulation illustrates how a 
decrease in sleep would affect the individual. With six hours simulated sleep, the average 
predicted effectiveness fell to 81.05 %, with work interval effectiveness calculated as 
83.89 %. Leading Seaman CIS is illustrated at Figure 14 and 15 for six and eight hours 




Figure 14.  FAST Simulation – Leading Seaman CIS  
6 hours assumed sleep 
 
Figure 15.  FAST Simulation – Leading Seaman CIS  
8 hours assumed sleep 
 
 
The FAST and NMD simulation provided several test cases for blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) indicators. The FAST BAC scale provides a commonly used point 
of reference for performance and cognitive impairment. The BAC scale is on the right 
hand side vertical axis of the FAST graph. Select cases from the simulation are shown at 
Appendix E. Able Seaman Marine Technician (ID 16) is shown in Figure 16 with six 
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hours simulated sleep on average over the three-week period. During 13 separate watch 
periods between 1600 h and 0800 h throughout the simulation, the crew member’s 
performance equated to 0.05 BAC or worse. For the six-hour average sleep, the member 
had an average predicted effectiveness of 74.48%. The work, wake, and sleep intervals 
for the three-week were 74.89, 75.98, and 68.79 % respectively. The highest BAC for the 
period was over 0.08% and corresponds with a Lapse Index of 10+ and predicted 
effectiveness of 45.26 %. This event occurred on the 15th of November, shown in the red 
box in Figure 16. The member was simulated with a weekly average of 31.33 watch 
hours and 23.83 maintenance hours. On November 15, the member stood watch for eight 
hours. Watches were conducted from 0000 h – 0400 h and 2000 h – 2359 h.  
Figure 16.  FAST Simulation—Able Seaman Marine Technician  
6 hours average sleep 
 
 
Appendix E shows a comparison in BAC for the Commanding Officer with a six 
and eight-hour sleep simulation. The Navigator’s BAC is also shown with six hours 
sleep. The Navigator’s BAC simulation shows several instances where BAC exceeded 
0.05 % while on watch, shown in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17.  FAST Simulation—Navigator 6 hrs sleep with BAC 
 
 
C. VALIDATION OF NAVAL MANAGEMENT DIARY USING SIMULATED ACPB CREW 
The final methodology utilized in this thesis was a comparison of the risk levels 
associated to ‘periods of activity’ that were calculated within the NMD compared to the 
same periods of activity and their associated risk calculated by using predicted 
effectiveness in FAST.  
Results in Table 7 show statistically significant differences in risk classification 
between FAST and NMD (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001). Specifically, approximately 83% 
of the events are classified as low risk both in the NMD (P=0) and in FAST, i.e., average 
predicted effectiveness is greater than 77.5% in FAST. Likewise, 2.73% of events 
described as high risk in the NMD match the high-risk classification in FAST predictions. 
However, there is a 14% misclassification rate corresponding to 61 periods of activity in 
the NMD. Specifically, 11 events that were predicted as high risk in FAST are classified 
as low risk in NMD. Similarly, 50 events classified as low risks in FAST are classified as 
high risk in NMD. Cells in Table 7 include the number of events and the corresponding 
percentage of total number of events. 
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Table 7.   Risk Events (Average Predicted Effectiveness <77.5% with 6-hr sleep) 
FAST Risk Level 
NMD Risk Level 
Total 
Low High 
No Risk 366 (83.37%) 50 (11.39%) 416 (94.76%) 
High Risk 11 (2.51%) 12 (2.73%) 23 (5.24%) 
Total 377 (85.88%) 62 (14.12%) 439 
 
Results in Table 8 show statistically significant differences in risk classification 
between FAST and NMD (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001). Specifically, approximately 59% 
of the events are classified as low risk in both the NMD (P=0) and in FAST, i.e., average 
predicted effectiveness is >77.5%. Likewise, approximately 8% of the events described 
as high risk in the NMD match the high risk classification in FAST. However, the 
remaining 32% of events are misclassified corresponding to 141 events across the 3-week 
period. Twenty-six events have a low risk prediction in FAST but a high risk prediction 
in the NMD. Similarly, 115 events classified as low risk in the NMD were identified as 
high risk in FAST. 
Table 8.   Contingency Table FAST 6 (Minimum predicted effectiveness<77.5% with 6-
hr sleep) 
FAST Risk Level 
NMD Risk Level 
Total 
Low High 
No Risk 262 (59.68%) 26 (5.92%) 288 (65.60%) 
High Risk 115 (26.20%) 36 (8.20%) 151 (34.40%) 
Total 377 (85.88%) 62 (14.12%) 439 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the NMD periods of activity with FAST minimum predicted 
effectiveness (six hours sleep) and the corresponding NMD risk levels. Assuming FAST 
as the valid classification, the black points highlighted in the red boxes represent the 
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periods of activity that have been erroneously categorized by the NMD. The proportion 
of erroneous points in the LOW NMD level suggest that the parameters of the NMD 
metric may be incorrect and may underestimate the associated risk for those periods of 
activity. Ideally, all points in the LOW NMD level should be above 77.5% on the FAST 
scale.  
Figure 18.  FAST 6-hour Sleep Predicted Effectiveness and Associated  
Naval Management Diary Risk Categorization by ‘Period of Activity’ 
 
 
Table 8, which used six hours average sleep, illustrates a more realistic 
operational picture than that which is provided by other estimates in the study that used 
eight hours simulated sleep. It is reasonable to estimate 6-hours of sleep per night for 
individual crew members. The comparison in Table 8 used the minimum predicted 
effectiveness which illustrates the lowest possible effectiveness for that ‘period of 
activity.’ 
Several potential explanations could account for the absence of misclassifications 
in the medium-high and high sections. The sample only included 12 periods of activity 
associated with these levels of risk. An increased sample size may offer more insight into 
this relationship. In addition, the parameters of the risk levels may warrant further 




are limited to the points value which is calculated using opportunity to sleep in the 
previous 48 hours. The interpretation of ‘opportunity to sleep’ is flawed since the 
measurement cannot be updated retrospectively, nor can the outcome be improved by 
actually resting or having sleep. Sleep itself is not used in the calculation within the 
NMD. The parameters for medium-high were more restricted (10<P<16) when compared 
to low-medium (0<P<11); which may account for some events having lower risk 

















V. CONCLUSION,  LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis offers insight into the work week of a typical Armidale Class Patrol 
Boat (ACPB) Sailor. Typical ACPB operations include patrol in the northern waters off 
Australia in the Indian Ocean, South Pacific Ocean and Arafura Sea. This study hinged 
on simulated crew structures and events that are based on realistic crew and activity 
models. During the simulated 3-week underway period, the crew undertook a variety of 
tasks that were consistent with patrolling operations, including watch standing and 
boarding party operations. In addition to operating the platform to meet its tasking 
objectives, the crew had to contribute to vessel maintenance and emergent repairs.  
This thesis considered several elements of crew scheduling in the RAN. It 
examined the proposed implementation of the NSWW, the effects of six and eight hours 
daily sleep in predicted effectiveness of crew members, and the validation of the fatigue 
management tool within the NMD for the ACPB community. Based on our simulation of 
typical seagoing activities for an RAN ACPB crew, results showed that watch standing 
hours for all crew members were less than the proposed Navy Standard Work Week 
(NSWW) allotment i.e., the simulated crew was allocated 56 hours of watch weekly but 
no crew members stood watch for that amount of time. The simulation showed that 
maintenance allocation was deficient for 10 members of the 21-person crew, i.e., more 
hours of maintenance were conducted than allotted in the NSWW. In the simulated 
underway period, technical sailors and officers had more maintenance and were therefore 
more prone to discrepancies in this category.  
Of those personnel who stood watch, none were allocated excessive watch hours 
in the simulation. Despite this, all crew members standing watch saw a degradation of 
predicted effectiveness levels in FAST when their simulated sleep decreased from eight 
to six hours daily.  Some of the resulting predicted effectiveness levels – along with their 
associated Lapse Likelihood Index and blood alcohol concentrations – highlight the 
concern for watch stander performance when fatigued. The proposed RAN NSWW 
analysis highlighted the need for further research with a larger data sample and valid tool 
to ascertain whether there might be a need for platform specific work weeks with NSWW 
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category allocation specific to occupational specializations. Further, NSWW category 
allocations should be specific to occupational specialization.  
The interpretation of the results for the NMD/FAST validation portion of this 
study should be applied with caution since only five of a possible 21 crew members were 
included in this preliminary analysis. However, conflicting results are clearly 
demonstrated when comparing the risk levels identified by the fatigue management tool 
in the NMD with the outcomes of models such as SAFTE and FAST. The operational 
outcomes are also in question. The acceptable level of risk deemed by command varies 
according to the ship activity and covers a wide variety of factors including environment, 
operational objectives and individual and collective crew safety.  
The methodology of the simulation was flawed in several areas. Activities were 
coded using the proposed NSWW categories; however, there is some room for 
interpretation. For example, service diversion, as a category in the NSWW, is an 
umbrella term that could be applied in different ways. Self-reported diaries could offer 
further insight into the actual allocation of time of crew members when underway. The 
results of the current analysis should be viewed with caution and may not be 
generalizable due to the limitations of the simulation. These limitations include the use of 
a single platform type and the small size of the crew. The statistical comparisons of risk 
classifications are based on the assumption of independence. Future efforts with larger 
data sets should take into account that each participant provides multiple data points. 
Individual crew members may supply differing numbers of data points as well. Both of 
these challenges highlight the need for careful attention in using this methodology and 
also in extrapolation of the results.  
The predicted effectiveness simulation using six hours of sleep offered a more 
operationally valid insight into the predicted effectiveness and potential risk due to 
fatigue than the eight hour daily sleep simulations since crew members are rarely able to 
obtain eight hours of sleep each day. A key flaw identified in the NMD model was the 
assumption of sleep based on the opportunity to sleep or rest. While it would be nice to 
imagine that crew members always take advantage of opportunities to sleep, this 
assumption is not warranted. Additionally, several ‘periods of activity’ were found to 
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have discrepancies from the described NMD risk parameters, i.e., the equations did not 
generate the expected risk levels. In is current status, the NMD is vulnerable to 
manipulation of data. The risk status of a crew member can be changed from high risk to 
low risk simply by deleting events. The danger of this feature is that this change may not 
accurately reflect their risk level. If the results are altered, the ship’s reporting system for 
risk may be artificially lower than the actual risk level. In addition, these alterations can 
be made by anyone with access to the NMD. This point highlights the need for the NMD 
data to be accurate and up-to-date, allowing individuals to precisely record changes that 
are made to scheduled events. If an individual’s events change, the NMD should be 
updated retrospectively to allow correct assessment of the member’s performance.  
An additional flaw identified in the study was the classification of events in the 
NMD. Events were based solely of periods of activity identified by the Outlook function. 
Time between events was not efficiently calculated or used in the associated risk 
algorithm.  The simulation attempted to overcome this problem but is still based on the 
‘best case’ scenario of six or eight hours sleep per day.  
In terms of recommendations, this thesis found a number of potential directions 
for future research. The NMD and its associated risk levels compared to the FAST 
predicted effectiveness levels indicate significant disagreement between the two tools. 
One explanation for this difference is that the results provided by FAST are inaccurate.  
The disparity may also reside in the points scoring algorithm that underlies the NMD 
fatigue classification system. Additionally, the weakness may relate to the parameters of 
the NMD points score for the four levels of fatigue risk currently used. The NMD 
formulas must be carefully verified in future efforts.  
A larger sample size could increase external validity of the results and potentially 
provide additional insight. Studies using a larger sample size may also benefit from 
analysis using different NMD risk levels rather than the two that were used in this thesis 
(i.e., P=0 [LOW], P≠0 [HIGH]). Future studies should also include the time periods not 
classified by NMD as ‘periods of activity’, which, in this study were not measured 
against FAST predicted effectiveness. More accurate studies of real life events using 
tools such as activity logs and actigraphy while underway would assist in further 
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validation of the NMD and the proposed NSWW. It is recommended that future studies 
also compare the NMD risk factors with empirically-derived estimates of performance 
such as that offered by validated psychomotor vigilance performance testing.  
Before the RAN implements major policy changes such as NMD and NSWW, 
care should be taken to ensure all underlying tools produce valid and reliable results. 
Neglecting this critical step may result in the misclassification of potential risk and 




APPENDIX A. SUMMARY TABLE INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBER 
DAILY SIMULATED ACTIVITY (WEEKLY AVERAGES) 
CREW MEMBER WATCH MAINTENANCE TRAINING MEETING SLEEP MESS PERSONAL
CO 15.42 35.67 8.33 8.08 54.75 17.00 28.75
XO 16.42 25.42 9.50 16.92 47.42 15.92 36.42
NAV 49.08 8.17 4.08 7.75 55.92 13.58 29.42
CPO 8.33 50.08 3.67 9.83 56.00 17.67 22.42
ABMT 32.08 29.08 5.33 4.33 53.75 15.08 28.33
LSBM 50.75 5.75 9.25 4.00 55.08 13.00 30.17
LSCK 2.75 40.83 3.58 2.08 56.00 18.50 44.25
ABBM 35.83 9.33 10.25 5.08 53.25 13.00 41.25
ABBM 36.83 6.25 11.00 5.83 54.50 13.58 40.00
ABBM 34.92 5.83 9.08 5.33 54.67 13.42 44.75
ABCIS 3.92 9.58 8.25 5.25 55.83 17.00 68.17
ABET 29.33 15.00 5.58 2.00 55.42 13.33 47.33
LSET 31.33 17.00 5.83 3.92 56.67 13.92 39.33
ABMT 31.33 23.83 3.75 4.00 51.25 11.67 42.17
POB 37.17 6.75 8.17 3.92 53.08 13.92 45.00
PONPC 37.33 4.75 6.50 4.25 51.00 13.08 51.08
ABCK 2.42 40.00 3.83 1.92 56.00 17.67 46.17
ABET 24.58 9.50 1.42 1.67 52.08 9.92 68.83
LSB 36.08 6.75 3.92 3.83 56.08 13.58 47.75
ABBM 34.08 5.08 5.00 5.17 56.00 14.50 48.17
LSCIS 3.25 8.08 2.58 3.75 56.00 18.25 76.08
NSWW Allocation 56 14 7 4 56 14 17  
 
Simulated NSWW Categories in hours assuming 8 hours sleep where possible 
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APPENDIX  B. SUMMARY TABLE INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBER 
ACTIVITY DIFFERENCE FROM NAVY STANDARD WORK 
WEEK 
CREW MEMBER WATCH MAINTENANCE TRAINING MEETING SLEEP MESS PERSONAL
Commanding Officer 40.58 ‐21.67 ‐1.33 ‐4.08 1.25 ‐3.00 ‐11.75
Executive Officer 39.58 ‐11.42 ‐2.50 ‐12.92 8.58 ‐1.92 ‐19.42
NAV 6.92 5.83 2.92 ‐3.75 0.08 0.42 ‐12.42
CPO 47.67 ‐36.08 3.33 ‐5.83 0.00 ‐3.67 ‐5.42
ABMT 23.92 ‐15.08 1.67 ‐0.33 2.25 ‐1.08 ‐11.33
LSBM 5.25 8.25 ‐2.25 0.00 0.92 1.00 ‐13.17
LSCK 53.25 ‐26.83 3.42 1.92 0.00 ‐4.50 ‐27.25
ABBM 20.17 4.67 ‐3.25 ‐1.08 2.75 1.00 ‐24.25
ABBM 19.17 7.75 ‐4.00 ‐1.83 1.50 0.42 ‐23.00
ABBM 21.08 8.17 ‐2.08 ‐1.33 1.33 0.58 ‐27.75
ABCIS 52.08 4.42 ‐1.25 ‐1.25 0.17 ‐3.00 ‐51.17
ABET 26.67 ‐1.00 1.42 2.00 0.58 0.67 ‐30.33
LSET 24.67 ‐3.00 1.17 0.08 ‐0.67 0.08 ‐22.33
ABMT 24.67 ‐9.83 3.25 0.00 4.75 2.33 ‐25.17
POB 18.83 7.25 ‐1.17 0.08 2.92 0.08 ‐28.00
PONPC 18.67 9.25 0.50 ‐0.25 5.00 0.92 ‐34.08
ABCK 53.58 ‐26.00 3.17 2.08 0.00 ‐3.67 ‐29.17
ABET 31.42 4.50 5.58 2.33 3.92 4.08 ‐51.83
LSB 19.92 7.25 3.08 0.17 ‐0.08 0.42 ‐30.75
ABBM 21.92 8.92 2.00 ‐1.17 0.00 ‐0.50 ‐31.17
LSCIS 52.75 5.92 4.42 0.25 0.00 ‐4.25 ‐59.08  
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APPENDIX  C. INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBER ACTIVITY 
DIFFERENCE FROM NAVY STANDARD WORK WEEK 
Figure 19.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results CO (ID 1) 
 
 
Figure 20.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 21.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Navigator (ID 3) 
 
Figure 22.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 23.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
PO Naval Police Coxswain (ID 5) 
 
Figure 24.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 25.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Leading Seaman Bosun’s Mate (ID 7) 
 
Figure 26.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 27.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Leading Seaman Electrical Technician (ID 9) 
 
Figure 28.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 29.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Able Seaman Bosun’s Mate (ID 11) 
 
Figure 30.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 31.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results A 
ble Seaman Communication Information Systems (ID 13) 
 
 
Figure 32.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results A 
ble Seaman Marine Technician (ID 14) 
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Figure 33.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results A 
ble Seaman Electrical Technicians (ID 15) 
 
 
Figure 34.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results A 
ble Seaman Marine Technician (ID 16) 
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Figure 35.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Able Seaman Cook (ID 17) 
 
Figure 36.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results A 






Figure 37.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
Leading Seaman Bosun  (ID 19) 
 
Figure 38.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  




Figure 39.  Simulated allocation vs NSWW allocation difference results  
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APPENDIX  D. SIMULATED FAST (8 AND 6 HOUR  
SLEEP WITH LAPSE INDEX) 
Figure 40.  FAST Simulation—Commanding Officer, 8 hrs sleep  
with lapse index 
 
 
Figure 41.  FAST Simulation—Commanding Officer, 6 hrs sleep  




Figure 42.  FAST Simulation—Executive Officer, 8 hrs sleep  
with lapse index 
 
 



















Figure 46.  FAST Simulation—Chief Petty Officer (Senior Technical),  





Figure 47.  FAST Simulation—Chief Petty Officer (Senior Technical),  




Figure 48.  FAST Simulation—Petty Officer (Naval Police Coxswain),  





Figure 49.  FAST Simulation—Petty Officer (Naval Police Coxswain),  





Figure 50.  FAST Simulation—Petty Officer (Boatswain),  





Figure 51.  FAST Simulation—Petty Officer (Boatswain),  





Figure 52.  FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Boatswain),  





Figure 53.  FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Boatswain),  












Figure 55.  FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Cook),  







Figure 56.  FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Electrical Technician),  





Figure 57.  FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Electrical Technician),  





Figure 58.  FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  





Figure 59.  FAST Simulation— Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  





Figure 60.  FAST Simulation— Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  





Figure 61.  FAST Simulation— Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  







Figure 62. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 63. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 64. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (CIS),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 65. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (CIS),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 66. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Marine Technician),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 67. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Marine Technician), 
 6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 68. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Electrical Technician),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 69. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Electrical Technician),  
Figure 70. 6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 71. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Marine Technician),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 72. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Marine Technician),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 73. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Cook),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 74. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Cook),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
94
Figure 75. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Electrical Technician 18),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 76. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Electrical Technician 18),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 77. FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Bosun 19),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 78. FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (Bosun 19),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 79. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Bosun’s Mate 20),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 80. FAST Simulation—Able Seaman (Bosun’s Mate 20),  
6 hrs sleep with lapse index 
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Figure 81. FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (CIS 21),  
8 hrs sleep with lapse index 
Figure 82. FAST Simulation—Leading Seaman (CIS 21),  
6 hrs sleep  
with lapse index 
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APPENDIX  E. SIMULATED FAST (BAC—SELECTED CASES) 
Figure 83.  FAST Simulation— Navigator 6 hrs sleep with  




Figure 84.  FAST Simulation— Able Seaman (Marine Technician 16)  





Figure 85.  FAST Simulation— Commanding Officer  




Figure 86.  FAST Simulation— Commanding Officer  





Figure 87.  FAST Simulation— Able Seaman (Bosun’s Mate 11)  
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APPENDIX  F. SUMMARY TABLE OF SIMULATED ACTIVITY  
OF INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBER—FAST 
Table 9.   FAST Summary Table – CO (8hrs) Average Effort  
  
 
Table 10.   FAST Summary Table – Executive Officer (8hrs) Average Effort  
 







Table 12.   FAST Summary Table – CPO (Senior Technical Officer 4) (8hrs)  








Table 14.   FAST Summary Table – Petty Officer (Bosun 6) (8hrs)  












Table 16.   FAST Summary Table – Leading Seaman (Cook 8) (8hrs) Average Effort  
   
 
Table 17.   FAST Summary Table – Leading Seaman (Electrical Technician 9) (8hrs) 
Average Effort  








Table 18.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate 10) (8hrs)  
Average Effort  
   
 
 
Table 19.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate 11) (8hrs)  
Average Effort  
  
 
Table 20.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Bosuns Mate 12) (8hrs)  











Table 22.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Marine Technician 14) (8hrs)  
Average Effort  
  
 
Table 23.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Electrical Technician 15) (8hrs) 





Table 24.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Marine Technician 16) (8hrs)  




Table 25.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Cook 17) (8hrs) Average Effort  
   
 
 
Table 26.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Electrical Technician 18) (8hrs) 








Table 27.   FAST Summary Table – Leading Seaman (Bosun 19)  




Table 28.   FAST Summary Table – Able Seaman (Bosun’s Mate 20)  




Table 29.   FAST Summary Table – Leading Seaman (CIS 21)  
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APPENDIX  G. SUMMARY TABLE OF SIMULATED AVAILABLE, 
PRODUCTIVE AND NON-AVAILABLE TIME 
CREW MEMBER ID AVAILABLE TIME NON‐AVAILABLE TIME PRODUCTIVE TIME TOTAL
CO 1 16.42 100.50 51.08 168.00
XO 2 26.42 99.75 41.83 168.00
NAV 3 11.83 98.92 57.25 168.00
CPO 4 13.50 96.08 58.42 168.00
ABMT 14 9.67 97.17 61.17 168.00
LSBM 7 13.25 98.25 56.50 168.00
LSCK 8 5.67 118.75 43.58 168.00
ABBM 10 15.33 107.50 45.17 168.00
ABBM 11 16.83 108.08 43.08 168.00
ABBM 12 14.42 112.83 40.75 168.00
ABCIS 13 13.50 141.00 13.50 168.00
ABET 15 7.58 116.08 44.33 168.00
LSET 9 9.75 109.92 48.33 168.00
ABMT 16 7.75 105.08 55.17 168.00
POB 6 12.08 112.00 43.92 168.00
PONPC 5 10.75 115.17 42.08 168.00
ABCK 17 5.75 119.83 42.42 168.00
ABET 18 4.33 111.75 51.92 168.00
LSB 19 7.75 117.42 42.83 168.00
ABBM 20 10.17 118.67 39.17 168.00
LSCIS 21 6.33 150.33 11.33 168.00  
 
Available time = training + meeting 
Non-available time = sleep + messing + personal 
Productive time = maintenance + watch 
Total time = NSWW 168 hours 
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